

Managing 600 OpenBSD-based Firewalls in Microsoft-Centric Small and Medium Businesses

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
November 13, 2010

Outline

- AccessEnforcer: OpenBSD-based firewall
- Overview of development
- How OpenBSD is used
- Packaging and updates
- Challenges & lessons learned
- Conclusion



Timeline




- **An OpenBSD-based multifunction firewall**
 - A Unified Threat Management (UTM) appliance
 - Built for SMB IT professionals who use Microsoft-centric products and technologies
- **Functionality**
 - Firewall (PF)
 - IDS/IPS (Snort)
 - Email filtering (spam & antivirus)
 - Web filtering
 - IPsec VPN
 - CalyptixVPN (OpenVPN)
 - Active Directory integration
 - Reporting



AE3000

AccessEnforcer GUI



AccessEnforcer Models



AE750

AE750


Up to 10 users



AE1000

AE1000

Up to 25 users



AE2000

AE2000

Up to 50 users



AE3000

AE3000

Up to 100 users

Standard GUI across all units

My official role at Calyptix



Code!

My REAL role at Calyptix

Code!

Support/firefighting

Release
engineering

Strategy

Provide training


Admin UNIX
servers

Testing & QA

Oversee
manufacturing

Interface with
sales & marketing

Booth bunny



Microsoft-Centric SMB defined

- 1 to 250 users
- Most are in the < 25 range
- IT Manager
 - Usually an outside IT consultant/firm
 - Larger sites may have an inside IT manager
 - Microsoft specialist; little to no UNIX experience
- Microsoft-centric products
 - 95% have a Windows Server (almost always Small Business Server) with Microsoft Exchange
 - Active Directory
 - Microsoft Outlook, Office, SharePoint, etc

Our SMB customers

- 
- CPA firms
 - Law firms
 - Furniture stores
 - Private schools
 - Churches
 - Hotels
 - Doctors' offices
 - Restaurants
 - Hospitals
 - Chemists
 - Defense contractors
 - Software development firms
 - Manufacturing firms
 - Museums
 - Firehouses
 - Chambers of commerce
 - Funeral homes
 - *Also a few home users...*

Why Microsoft-Centric SMBs?

- SMBs are the backbone of the US economy
 - **>26 million SMBs** in the USA
 - Half of all private sector jobs
 - Created **~70% of all new jobs** in past decade
- Small businesses
 - Least IT resources
 - Budget constraints
 - A serious security incident could affect the entire company
- Microsoft Windows
 - Most popular = Most targeted!
- **Needs security the most!**

Why OpenBSD?

- Security and code quality
 - Secure by default
 - Readable, peer-reviewed code
- Simplicity and practicality
 - Sane defaults
 - Less is more
- Great documentation
 - Documentation is not an afterthought
 - Readable man pages!




Why OpenBSD?

- Great development environment out of the box
 - Convenient data structures for C: queue.h, tree.h
 - Secure coding facilities: strlcpy(3), strlcat(3), strtonum(3), arc4random(3)
 - Features like ProPolice help detect bugs in our software
 - Useful libraries and tools in base, e.g. libevent, tmux, etc.
- PF (and access to latest version of PF)
- True Freedom
 - It's really free! Unencumbered code in base
 - Thorough license audit



Most Common Deployment



- One LAN
- SBS serves DHCP & DNS
- SBS runs Exchange for email (SMTP)
- Active Directory
- Remote Web Workplace (RWW)
- Outlook Web Access (OWA)
- RPC over HTTPS (or HTTP ☹)
- Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP)
- SharePoint
- PPTP ☹

Windows
Small Business Server
(includes Exchange)

AccessEnforcer Development

For the Microsoft-trained IT Manager:

- Web interface GUI
 - Limited CLI shell for recovery
- Make it easy
 - Admin should not need to know *any* UNIX whatsoever to operate the product
- Simplicity and sane defaults!
 - As few knobs as possible
 - Just the stuff they need (no BGP, etc)
- Seamless integration with Microsoft products
 - Especially Windows Small Business Server

Our own requirements:

- Secure by default as much as possible
 - Each unit has randomly-generated default passwords (no two units have same passwords)
 - HTTPS-only web interface
- Discourage or do not support weak protocols
 - Definitely no telnet server!
 - Example: DES intentionally not supported, MD5 highly discouraged
- It should “just work”

Our Dev Environment

- C, Ruby, Korn shell, Perl, PHP, Lua, some C++
- Visual Studio for Windows apps
- PostgreSQL
- Started with CVS, recently moved to Git
- Source tree compiled using BSD make
- Multi-platform development environment
 - OpenBSD
 - Windows XP, Vista, 7
 - Windows SBS 2003, SBS 2008
 - Mac OS X 10.5, 10.6
 - Ubuntu Linux



Adopted OpenBSD practices

- Source tree organized roughly according to hier(7)
 - Compiled with BSD make; no autotools, thankfully
- Coding style
- Code auditing and review
 - Manual review each other's code
 - Review of GUI code for web application security issues, e.g. SQL injections, cross-site scripting, and CSRF
 - Static analysis with LLVM clang
- Branch name conventions (e.g. AEF_3_0)
- -Wall



AccessEnforcer versions


- AccessEnforcer v1.0 (Ancient History; EOL'ed)
 - OpenBSD 3.8
- AccessEnforcer v2.0
 - OpenBSD 4.0, with backported security fixes and programs from OpenBSD CVS
- AccessEnforcer v3.0
 - OpenBSD 4.7, with errata patches

How OpenBSD is used

How OpenBSD is used

- Minimal installation
 - bsd, bsd.rd, base47.tgz, and etc47.tgz
- GENERIC kernel
- Many base tools, some with modifications
- PF enabled
 - NAT, rdr-to for port forwarding rules, and a LOT of other networking functions

Software Stack



Changes to OpenBSD

- /etc/rc replaced with our own startup script
- No rc.conf
- Init scripts placed in init.d
 - Generally a conf script to generate the config file
 - Init script to start/restart/stop program
 - Background watchdog program to ensure all programs in correct state
- Turned off unused services (echo, daytime, etc)

- **Firewall & Networking**
 - ifconfig, pfctl, ftp-proxy
- **DHCP**
 - dhcpd, dhclient
- **IPsec VPN**
 - ipsecctl, isakmpd
- **Diagnostic tools**
 - arp, dig, ping, traceroute, tcpdump, whois
- **Monitoring**
 - snmpd, syslogd
- **Many more...**
 - Examples: ntpd, halt, ifstated, etc.

Example: IPsec VPN

- Powered by ipsecctl(8), isakmpd(8) and ipsec.conf
- Manual keying and automatic keying
- Encryption and authentication algorithms
- Single-page setup!

The screenshot shows the 'IPsec Policy Configuration' page in the AccessEnforcer™ web interface. The interface includes a navigation bar with icons for Home, Security, Setup, Users, Reports, and Help. A sidebar on the left lists VPN-related options: IPsec Policies, CalyptxVPN Settings, CalyptxVPN Notifications, CalyptxVPN Users, and PPTP Passthrough. The main content area is titled 'IPsec Policy Configuration' and contains a 'Back to: IPsec Policies' link and a 'Start IPsec Wizard' button. Below these are input fields for 'Policy Name', 'Remote LAN', 'Local LAN', 'Local IP', and 'Remote Peer IP/FQDN'. A note states: 'The AccessEnforcer™ supports IPsec NAT traversal by default.' The 'IPsec mode' section has two radio buttons: 'Manual Keying' and 'Automatic Keying (IKE)'. The configuration is divided into 'Phase 1 Main Mode' and 'Phase 2 Quick Mode'. Each phase has sections for 'Traffic Encryption Algorithm', 'Traffic Authentication Algorithm', and 'Diffie Hellman Group'. The 'SA Lifetime' is set to 3600 seconds for Phase 1 and 1200 seconds for Phase 2. A 'Preshared Key' field is present. The 'Protocol' section has radio buttons for 'ESP - Encapsulating Security Payload (Tunnel Mode) (Recommended)' and 'AH - Authentication Header (Transport Mode)', with a checked 'Enable this policy' checkbox. At the bottom, there are 'Save Policy' and 'Cancel' buttons, a note about refreshing connections, and a link to 'IPsec Help'. The footer contains copyright information: 'Copyright © 2004-2010 Calyptix Security Corporation. All rights reserved.' and 'Calyptix AE2200 Version 3.0.7 | 1022076001'.

Example: tcpdump

- Packet Analyzer diagnostic tool
- Accepts BPF syntax

Diagnostics

Diagnostic Tools:

Packet Analyzer

Capture packets off of the interface.

Stop after packets.

BPF syntax: [help](#)

Results:

[Download TCPdump file](#)

```
22:05:23.935208 .64440 > 208.67.222.222.53: 21004+ A? www.update.microsoft.c
22:05:23.965244 208.67.222.222.53 > .64440: 21004 1/0/0 A 65.55.185.26 (68)
22:05:25.531760 .54377 > 8.8.8.8.53: 57723+ A? google.com. (28)
22:05:25.541103 8.8.8.8.53 > .54377: 57723 6/0/0 A 74.125.65.105, A 74.125.6
22:05:35.553798 .65530 > 8.8.8.8.53: 57284+ A? google.com. (28)
22:05:35.563569 8.8.8.8.53 > .65530: 57284 6/0/0 A 74.125.65.105, A 74.125.6
22:05:45.539800 .63402 > 8.8.8.8.53: 64025+ A? google.com. (28)
22:05:45.552685 8.8.8.8.53 > .63402: 64025 6/0/0 A 74.125.65.105, A 74.125.6
22:05:55.556632 .55046 > 8.8.8.8.53: 12565+ A? google.com. (28)
22:05:55.566509 8.8.8.8.53 > .55046: 12565 6/0/0 A 74.125.65.105, A 74.125.6
```

Packaging

Packaging/Update Decisions

- How to package and update...
 - Our own software
 - Kernel
 - Errata patches
 - Third-party applications (ports) that need modification
 - Nightly updates, like virus signatures
- Writing our own packaging tool vs. using OpenBSD's pkg_* tools

Kernel Port

```
COMMENT=      OpenBSD kernel

DISTNAME=     kernel-${OSREV}.20100317
PKGNAME=      ${DISTNAME}p1
CATEGORIES=   kernel
MASTER_SITES= ${FTP_MIRROR}/${OSREV}/

# For common errata patches
MASTER_SITES0= ${FTP_MIRROR}patches/${OSREV}/common/

# For architecture-specific errata patches
MASTER_SITES1= ${FTP_MIRROR}patches/${OSREV}/${ARCH}/

PREFIX=/
```

Kernel Port

```
ERRATA_COMMON+= 002_mpi.patch:0  
ERRATA_COMMON+= 004_pfsync.patch:0  
ERRATA_COMMON+= 005_pfsync.patch:0  
ERRATA_COMMON+= 006_scsi.patch:0  
ERRATA_COMMON+= 007_scsi.patch:0
```

```
ERRATA_ARCH+=
```

```
SRC_FILES= sys.tar.gz
```

```
DISTFILES= ${SRC_FILES} ${ERRATA_COMMON} ${ERRATA_ARCH}  
DIST_SUBDIR= ${PKGNAME}
```

Kernel Port

do-extract:

```
cd ${WRKDIR} ; tar zxvf ${DISTDIR}/${DIST_SUBDIR}/${SRC_FILES}
```

pre-patch:

```
cd ${WRKDIR}/sys ; \  
for i in `bin/lis ${DISTDIR}/${DIST_SUBDIR}/*.patch`; \  
do \  
    patch -t -p1 < $$i; \  
done
```


do-build:

```
.for conffile in GENERIC GENERIC.MP
  ( cd ${WRKDIR}/sys/arch/${ARCH}/conf ; \
    config ${conffile} ; \
    cd ${WRKDIR}/sys/arch/${ARCH}/compile/${conffile}; \
    make depend && make )
.endfor
```

do-install:

```
install -m 0755 -o root -g wheel \
  ${WRKDIR}/sys/arch/${ARCH}/compile/GENERIC/bsd \
  ${PREFIX}/bsd.sp
install -m 0755 -o root -g wheel \
  ${WRKDIR}/sys/arch/${ARCH}/compile/GENERIC.MP/bsd \
  ${PREFIX}/bsd.mp
```

Packing Errata Patches

- Errata patches built using a chroot environment
- Results in errata packages that can be added via pkg_add
- <http://labs.calyptix.com/openbsd-binary-patches-chroot.php>

errata-base port

- Extract OpenBSD's file sets (baseXX.tgz, compXX.tgz, etc) to /var/errata-base
- You will end up with all the files and directories of a bare OpenBSD system

\$ ls /var/errata-base/

```
altroot dev  home  root  stand  tmp  var  
bin  etc  mnt  sbin  sys  usr
```

Errata Port for 4.7 001_kerberos

```
ERRATA_NAME= 001_kerberos
```

```
ERRATA_ARCH= common
```

```
ERRATA_DATE= 20100331
```

```
BUILD_STEPS= "(\  
  cd /usr/src/lib/libkrb5 ; \  
  make obj ; make depend ; make ; make install ; \  
  cd /usr/src/kerberosV/libexec/kdc ; \  
  make obj ; make depend ; make ; make install \  
)"
```

```
BUILD_DEPENDS= :errata_base_$(OSREV)_$(MACHINE)-*:errata/$(OSREV)/base
```

```
.include "../bsd.errata.mk"
```

```
.include <bsd.port.mk>
```

- Download patch
- Apply patch to `/var/errata-base/usr/src`
- Generate build script
- Move `/var/errata-base/dev` out of the way
- Create a memory filesystem at `/var/errata-base/dev` with the contents of the original
- Run `"/var/errata-base/dev/MAKEDEV std"`
- Chroot to `/var/errata-base` and run build script

Build script

- Touch a “pre-build” cookie
- Run build steps defined in errata port (e.g. `cd /usr/src/lib/libkrb5 ; make ..`)
- Touch a “post-build” cookie
- Generate a packing list using `find(1)` to find all files:
 - That changed after pre-build cookie
 - That changed before post-build cookie
 - Excluding `/usr/src`, `/usr/obj`, `/usr/share/man`, `/usr/include`
- Create a tarball of the changed files

- Some stock OpenBSD ports require X11
 - Modified ports to work without X11
- Custom ports
 - Modified to provide better integration with our programs or remove unnecessary dependencies
 - Example: ClamAV does not need zoo, lha, arc archivers in the Microsoft world
- Dynamic ports
 - ClamAV virus signatures, spam signatures, URL blacklist database, etc.

clamav-virus-sigs dynamic port

clamav-virus-sigs Makefile:

```
COMMENT=      ClamAV virus signatures
```

```
PKGNAME= clamav-virus-sigs- $\{\text{TS}\}$ 
```

```
CATEGORIES=  security
```

```
MASTER_SITES=  $\{\text{HOMEPAGE}\}$ 
```

```
...
```

External shell script:

```
TS=`date +%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S`
```


```
make
```


Managing Updates

Update mechanism

- SSL-based update client/server system
 - Mutual authentication
- Two types of updates
 - Nightly packages (e.g. ClamAV virus signatures and spam patterns)
 - Major updates (e.g. v3.0.1 to v3.0.2)
- Update mechanism updates packages using the OpenBSD pkg_* tools

Update repositories



Update rollout

- >600 units
- Tuesdays, Wednesdays, Thursdays
 - Avoid Microsoft Patch Tuesday
- Between 2am and 5am
- Client notified by email a week before scheduled update
- Phased rollout
 - New releases are rolled out to authorized reseller partners' own units first, then their clients
 - Bugs and issues caught early

OpenBSD 4.0 to 4.7 upgrade

- **NOTE: This is work in progress! Not tested in production!**
- Download 4.7 file sets
- Backup old kernel, /sbin/reboot, and /bin/rm
- Extract base47.tgz
- Create a cookie and reboot
- On reboot, rc script detects cookie, performs upgrade steps from `faq/upgrade4{1..7}.html`, and other steps
- Reboot


Challenges & Lessons Hopefully Learned

Challenges: Microsoft

- Updates break things (surprise!)
- Windows Server insists on being DHCP and DNS server
- Upgraded system != New system
- Remote WMI and GPO may not work as expected
- Diversity of Windows systems
- UAC and OpenVPN
- Exchange rewrites headers
- PPTP and PF

Challenges: NKOTB

“Something is wrong. Who gets the blame?”



Challenges: “I don’t care!”

- ~~Nobody~~ Very few people truly care about security in the small business world
- “I just want it to work!”
- Plaintext passwords
 - Vendors building products based on plaintext FTP ☹️
 - RPC or OWA over HTTP ☹️
 - Sending passwords via email ☹️
- Business owner wants to be exempted from all security filters

Challenges: Keeping Up


- New technologies
 - Cloud, virtualization, etc.
- New mobile devices
 - iPhones, Android, etc.
- Lack of standards
 - VOIP phones



Image source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:NYC_subway-4C.svg

Lessons Hopefully Learned

- It's not about you, it's about the user
- But the customer is not always right
- Match your users' environment as closely and as early as possible
- Build self-help tools as soon as possible!
 - Knowledgebase articles, forums, etc.
 - Training



Conclusion

- OpenBSD is a great development platform!
 - Great tools and documentation
 - Excellent development practices can be adopted in a commercial dev environment
- Simplicity and sane defaults make sense in any product
- OpenBSD thrives in non-UNIX environments
 - More than 600 Microsoft-centric SMB sites, running OpenBSD!



Thank You!

Questions?

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